Of Bombs and Bureaucrats: Internal Drivers of Nuclear Force Building in China and the United States by Heginbotham, Eric et al.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
2018
Of Bombs and Bureaucrats: Internal Drivers of
Nuclear Force Building in China and the
United States
Heginbotham, Eric; Heim, Jacob L.; Twomey, Christopher P.
Taylor & Francis
Heginbotham, Eric, Jacob L. Heim, and Christopher P. Twomey. "Of Bombs and
Bureaucrats: Internal Drivers of Nuclear Force Building in China and the United
States." Journal of Contemporary China 28, no. 118 (2019): 538-557.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/66490
This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United
States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the
United States.
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
Of Bombs and Bureaucrats: Internal Drivers of Nuclear Force
Building in China and the United States
Eric Heginbothama, Jacob L. Heimb and Christopher P. Twomeyc
aMassachusetts Institute of Technology, USA; bRAND Corporation, USA; cNaval Postgraduate School, USA
ABSTRACT
This article examines the domestic influences on US and Chinese nuclear
forces. While strategic factors largely drive each side’s, underappreciated
domestic and organizational factors also influence outcomes. Partisan
politics shape US policies regarding arms control, missile defense, and
the roles of nuclear forces. China has its own— more opaque—politics.
Organizational factors have affected the status and role of the Chinese
Rocket Forces. Constituencies for nuclear weapons have gained ground,
and the military services appear to be competing for nuclear missions. The
absence of organizational firewalls within the Rocket Forces suggests that
assertive operational practices might bleed across different parts of the
organization. These domestic influences on US and Chinese nuclear policy-
making are likely to have interactive and accelerating effects. Both sides
will assume measures taken by the other are driven by strategic intent,
when the actual drivers may be mixed. To the extent that domestic factors
are responsible, the resulting spirals of suspicion and conflict will be
inadvertent—but may nevertheless take on a life of their own. While
strategic nuclear interactions are not currently at the center of the bilateral
relationship, they may come to be so in the future for all the wrong
reasons.
Although nuclear weapons issues are far from the center of the Sino–American relationship, they
are nevertheless important. As they did during the Cold War, nuclear weapons still present the
potential for catastrophic and unparalleled destruction and are, at the same time, regarded as the
backstop for US and Chinese national security. The arsenals of both countries are in the midst of
great qualitative and quantitative change. The nuclear forces, policies, and force postures of each
state influence the threat perception of the other and, therefore, the tenor of the bilateral relation-
ship. During crises and conflict, the combined shape and operation of the states’ respective nuclear
forces will affect the prospects for stability and escalation. And in the context of a shifting
conventional balance of power, assuring allies that extended nuclear deterrence remains credible
without alarming China about US intentions has become a more pressing issue.
The most important factors shaping both US and Chinese nuclear forces are external—perceived
threat from foreign states, considerations of international prestige, and the desire to meet inter-
national expectations—but domestic factors also play important, yet underappreciated, roles.
Despite the dominance of realist approaches in the literature on security policy, there is also a
wide body of work examining the impact of politics, bureaucracy, strategic cultures, and other
state-level factors. Domestic factors may be more or less important, depending on particular
circumstances, but they are rarely entirely absent. Indeed, much of the most productive work on
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domestic drivers of security policy and military strategy does not take an ‘either or’ approach, but
rather treats the domestic lenses through which external threats are interpreted and how choices
are framed and selected by those charged with responding to external threats.
This article examines the domestic influences on United States and, especially, Chinese nuclear
forces, and their effect on the bilateral relationship. The domestic influences on US nuclear policy
have been widely addressed, though usually in very specific historical contexts. There have been no
systematic studies of how domestic factors may operate in China. The article focuses on two
categories of domestic drivers: first, the role of national politics and political structures on nuclear
policymaking; and second, the influence of nuclear constituencies and bureaucratic politics and
processes (such as standard operating procedures [SOPs]) on nuclear forces and doctrine. These
lenses will be familiar to policy analysts and students of organizational behavior and bureaucratic
politics.1 And while they by no means exhaust the full range of domestic factors that could affect
nuclear development, they constitute some of the most important.
The article is divided into four sections. The first examines the East Asian security context for the
nuclear policies of each country and summarize the current state of each country’s nuclear forces
and policy. The second addresses the extant literature on domestic factors in US nuclear policy,
how those factors are evolving today, and how they might shape nuclear outcomes over the next
decade. The third assesses the domestic forces shaping nuclear forces and policy in China. The
fourth, and concluding section, examines the potential impact of domestic drivers on Sino–
American security dynamics.
The article finds that the scope for bureaucratic influence on nuclear forces and policy is growing in
both the United States and China, though in very different ways. In China, the nuclear constituency
within the military has gained rank and stature in recent years, and specific bureaucratic structures
and processes are accelerating qualitative improvements that may neither be actively sought nor
thoroughly understood by the political leadership. These developments are likely to push the People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) towards a more diversified force structure, one with greater warfighting
capability. In the US case, the well-documented polarization of politics gives rise to significant swings
in US nuclear posture and, to a lesser extent, force structure, while bureaucratic factors produce a
force structure with a larger variety of weapons than strictly necessary—as well as an exaggerated
emphasis on missile defense. These developments in China and the United States, though largely
domestically driven, are likely to have real strategic consequences, exacerbating already growing
mutual suspicion between the United States and China.
Regional security context and current nuclear postures
China’s rise is reconfiguring global politics at an exceptionally rapid pace. Chinese extraordinary
economic growth over the past four decades has enabled equally dramatic investment in the PLA.
While remaining broadly constant in terms of its ratio to China’s gross domestic product, military
spending has grown in inflation-adjusted terms by 9.6% per year since 1996 (see Figure 1). All this
has occurred while investment in military hardware elsewhere in the region has grown only
modestly.
At the same time, the United States faces new challenges to its position as global hegemon in
the post-Cold War era. Although its own military spending remains much larger than China’s
(roughly three times as high in 2017), its lower economic growth rate, global commitments, and
the cost of its ongoing conflicts in Central Asia and the Middle East, suggest relative decline. While
the geostrategic institutional structures that the United States established during the Cold War
remain intact, they have been under increasing strain as rising powers, such as China, India, and
1These models borrow language from, and are broadly consistent with Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision:
Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, 2nd ed. (New York: Addison-Wesley Longman Publishers, 1999), though we employ them
simply to outline broad influences on policy and programs.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 539
Brazil seek to adjust their terms; Russia, Iran, and North Korea push back against them, and as
populist politics have gained traction throughout the West, most notably in the United States.
There are several reasons to be concerned about security rivalry between the United States and
China. Some relate to shifting power dynamics. Alternatively termed hegemonic power transition or
the Thucydides Trap, periods when one great power rises rapidly relative to another have historically
increased the chances of great power war.2 At a more tangible level, territorial conflicts abound on
China’s maritime periphery, and some of those involve US allies or partners.3 Beijing continues to
regard Taiwan as a renegade province. Although the United States lacks a formal treaty with Taiwan,
close historical relations suggest the United States would likely become involved in any armed conflict
there. Smaller, sparsely populated islands in the East and South China Seas pose distinct problems.
The stakes are lower with regard to the Senkaku Islands than they are in the case of Taiwan, but the US
commitment is greater. Senior US government officials have repeated that the islands fall under the
purview of the US–Japan Security Treaty. While no such authoritative statement has been made
regarding the Spratly Islands, a treaty alliance with the Philippines and clear national interests in
freedom of navigation connect US interests to developments there. Finally, the situation on the
Korean peninsula could spark crises between Beijing and Washington. While opportunity for coopera-
tion exists, a war in Korea would likely find United States forces engaged in combat operations well
north of the 38th parallel near China’s border.
None of these potential flashpoints has an obvious nuclear component, but the shifting
conventional balance means that if the United States and China become engaged in a military
conflict, the US military can no longer rely on overwhelming conventional superiority. As one
recent study noted:
The PLA is not close to catching up to the U.S. military in terms of aggregate capabilities, but it does not need
to catch up to the United States to dominate its immediate periphery. The advantages conferred by proximity




































Figure 1. Chinese Defense Budget
Note: Official Chinese defense budget, first adjusted to constant 2018 RMB values, then converted to dollars using January 2018 exchange rate.
2Ronald L. Tammen and Jacek Kugler, ‘Power transition and China-US conflicts’, Chinese Journal of International Politics 1(1),
(2006), pp. 35–55; and Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? Reprint edition
(New York, NY: Mariner Books, 2018).
3M. Taylor Fravel, Things Fall Apart: Maritime Disputes and China’s Regional Diplomacy (Rochester, NY: Social Science Research
Network, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2466488 (accessed 14 October 2018).
4Eric Heginbotham, Michael Nixon, Forrest E. Morgan, Jacob L. Heim, Jeff Hagen, Sheng Li, Jeffrey Engstrom, Martin C. Libicki,
Paul DeLuca, David A. Shlapak, David R. Frelinger, Burgess Laird, Kyle Brady, and Lyle J. Morris, The US-China Military
Scorecard: Forces, Geography, and the Evolving Balance of Power, 1996–2017 (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2015), p.
xxx.
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A hotly contested fight could encourage, first, conventional escalation, and, subsequently, possible
consideration of nuclear options.5 Escalatory potential will also be directly affected by the nature
and number of nuclear forces, and it behooves us to understand the full range of variables that will
drive the future trajectory of those nuclear inventories and the way they are postured.
Chinese strategic forces and policy
For decades, China contented itself with a modestly sized and technically simple nuclear force. The
force was consistent with the restrained stated goals of its nuclear deterrent forces. China has, since
its first nuclear test in 1964, maintained a ‘no-first use’ policy, under which it foreswears the use of
nuclear weapons unless first attacked with nuclear weapons. In keeping with the views of China’s
early revolutionary leaders, who viewed nuclear weapons as having inherently awesome deterrent
capability but limited utility beyond deterrence, the standard of sufficiency was the maintenance of
a ‘lean and effective’ force. Unlike Cold War British or French minimum deterrent concepts, China
did not apparently adopt specific threshold levels of retaliation against potential adversaries.
Consistent with this distinctive minimum, almost existential, deterrent concept, the force
structure remained limited even as China’s economy accelerated. As late as the mid-2000s, China
possessed fewer than two-dozen missiles, each with a single warhead, that could reach the
continental United States. And although it maintained a larger force of theater ballistic missiles
—defined as missiles with a range less than 3500 kilometers and therefore suitable against targets
within the theater of operations—it foreswore tactical nuclear weapons and nuclear warfighting
doctrines.
After decades of slow and incremental change, the modernization and diversification of China’s
nuclear inventory has accelerated rapidly during the twenty-first century. China has developed a
variety of new solid-fueled road mobile missiles, including some (the DF-31A) that can target the
entire United States.6 A heavier road-mobile system, the DF-41, may also be nearing deployment.
The PLA-Navy (PLAN) took delivery of four Jin-class ballistic missile launching submarines between
2010 and 2015, providing China’s first credible sea-based deterrent. China has also provided its
older liquid fueled missiles (DF-5B) with multiple independently targeted reentry vehicles (MIRVs),
providing a quick boost in the number of deliverable warheads. It is deploying a sophisticated and
accurate theater systems (DF-26) and is testing hypersonic systems.7 Today, China likely has
roughly 130 warheads that can be delivered across the Pacific (including 48 submarine launched
missiles and various intercontinental ballistic missiles or ICBMs).
Chinese leaders and strategists insist that historical nuclear policies and doctrine remain
unchanged. They stipulate that the evolution of the force has been necessary to maintain the
ability to retaliate in the face of evolving US offensive and, especially, defensive capabilities. In
other words, they argue modernization is necessary to maintain the ‘lean and effective’ force.
However, while there is no evidence that China has significantly adjusted its nuclear policy or
doctrine, improving capabilities present PLA commanders with new operational possibilities that
may affect how doctrine is interpreted and executed. And, discussed below, many of the qualitative
improvements follow as much from bureaucratic imperatives or processes as they do from
calculations of threat and response. Nevertheless, they have strategic consequences.
5Caitlin Talmadge, ‘Would China go nuclear? Assessing the risk of chinese nuclear escalation in a conventional war with the
United States’, International Security 41(4), (2017), pp. 50–92; Avery Goldstein, ‘The pressing danger of crisis instability in US-
China relations’, International Security 37(4), (2013), pp. 49–89; and Charles L. Glaser and Steve Fetter, ‘Should the United
States reject MAD? Damage limitation and U.S. nuclear strategy toward China’, International Security 41(1), (2016), pp. 49–98.
6Material in this paragraph from Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s
Republic of China: Annual Report to Congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017). See also NASIC, Ballistic and
Cruise Missile Threat, NASIC-1031-0985-17 (Washington, DC, June 2017).
7Ankit Panda, ‘Introducing the DF-17: China’s newly tested ballistic missile armed with a hypersonic glide vehicle’, The
Diplomat, 28 December 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/introducing-the-df-17-chinas-newly-tested-ballistic-missile-
armed-with-a-hypersonic-glide-vehicle/ (accessed 29 November 2018).
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US strategic forces
The relative change in US nuclear forces has not been as rapid as that in China, largely because the
baseline for US capabilities was far more advanced. Nevertheless, the scale of US investment under
the plan announced during the waning months of the Obama administration is staggering,
estimated at $1.7 trillion over the next 30 years (including inflation).8 Several new systems are to
be developed and deployed: a new nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) class, a new
ICBM, a new strategic bomber, a new nuclear-armed cruise missile, and life extension of the
warheads for these nuclear systems.
Most of these programs will simply allow the United States to maintain its current position. As
former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter has written,
In the coming decades, the military’s bombers and 1970s-era ICBMs will reach the point at which their lifespan
can no longer be extended. At nearly thirty years old, the B-2 bomber is the newest system in the U.S. triad.
The air-launched cruise missile is already decades beyond its planned service life, its reliability is degrading,
and its viability is increasingly challenged by advanced air defenses. And the nation’s nuclear-armed submar-
ines will irreversibly age out of service beginning in 2027.9
In addition to updating or replacing existing systems, some new (or reconstituted) capabilities will
be generated under the current funded plan. The stealth and accuracy of standoff munitions will
be improved, and new means of delivering ‘gravity bombs’ (B-61-12) may be acquired. The 2018
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) lays out additional (currently unfunded) new capabilities to be
fielded, including low-yield submarine launched ballistic missiles and new nuclear-armed cruise
missiles. Some critics have argued that these systems may improve the US ability to launch a
disarming first strike, or at least threaten to do so, and may therefore spark an arms race with
Russia and/or China—and undermine crisis stability.10
Missile defense is also clearly a priority for the Trump administration and may further complicate
Beijing’s deterrent calculus.11 The United States deploys a wide range of missile defense systems.
Most important are 44 ground-based interceptors (GBI) deployed in Alaska and California designed
to defend against incoming ICBMs. While North Korean missiles are the stipulated targets, the
interceptors would clearly have some implications for China’s retaliatory capability. Beyond GBI,
advanced versions of the US Navy’s standard missile (SM-3 block IIA, in particular) have some—
albeit ambiguous—capability against ICBMs. Both those missiles and lower altitude systems
(THAAD and Patriot) would also play some role in defending targets within Asia from either nuclear
or conventional attack.
Thus, neither side is static in the strategic arena. The next sections investigate the domestic
drivers that work alongside strategic ones in shaping these changes.
The underappreciated importance of domestic drivers
International security concerns are critical drivers of US and Chinese nuclear posture. They are at
the heart of most realist analyses and represent what Allison and Zelicow refer to as the ‘rational
actor model.’12 At the same time, however, domestic political and bureaucratic factors also shape
the strategic policies of both countries. Domestic influences on the nuclear policies of the United
States have long been noted in the literature, but domestic influences in China have not been
8Congressional Budget Office, Approaches for managing the costs of U.S. nuclear forces, 2017 to 2046 (Washington, DC), 31
October 2017, https://www.cbo.gov/publication/53211 (accessed 29 November 2018).
9Ashton Carter, ‘Nuclear deterrence: Still the bedrock of US security’, The American Interest, 6 April 2017, https://www.the-
american-interest.com/2017/04/06/nuclear-deterrence-still-the-bedrock-of-us-security/.
10James E. Doyle, Renewing America’s Nuclear Arsenal: Options for the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2017).
11David Willman, ‘Trump administration moves to boost homeland missile defense system despite multiple flaws’, Los Angeles
Times, 24 December 2017, https://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-missile-defense-flaws-20171222-story.html.
12Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision; and Jerel A. Rosati, ‘Developing a systematic decision-making framework:
Bureaucratic politics in perspective’, World Politics 33(2), (1981), pp. 234–252.
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systematically treated. In both cases, domestic drivers have received less focus than international
ones—and less focus than their importance deserves.
Reactions and spirals may follow from the rational moves of one state acting in response to
signals in its external environment, but scholars and practitioners alike understand the principles
of ‘security dilemmas’ and have considered ways to mitigate them. If nothing else, leaders
appreciate that the actions of a potential competitor are driven in large measure by security
imperatives. Because less consideration has been given to domestic political and bureaucratic
drivers, military shifts brought about by them may engender particular suspicion since they may
not appear to be logical defensive reactions to threats. The two sections below highlight the
roles national governance and bureaucratic politics and processes play in shaping the strategic
policies of each country.
Domestic sources of US nuclear policy: politics complicate the rational actor model
In an 2015 essay on ‘The Politics of Nuclear Weapons Policy’, Robert Soofer (later appointed as
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear and Missile Defense Policy in the Trump
administration), wrote:
The conventional wisdom about policymaking suggests that decisions should flow from a rational calculation
of interests and objectives…. But as most of you know, that conventional wisdom is wrong…. In practice,
policy—even that initiated by the president—is affected by institutional procedures, bureaucratic politics, and
the push and pull of domestic and international politics.13
The current examination of domestic drivers on US strategic policy acknowledges the impor-
tance of strategic rationales (Allison and Zelicow’s ‘rational actor model’), but the section
focuses on the challenges facing an executive in setting and implementing policy, as well as
the party politics of nuclear decision-making. It also explores bureaucratic politics and
processes.
System and actors
The most obvious domestic influence on US nuclear policy is the nature of the US political system
—the push and pull between the two primary parties and the division of power within the federal
government, especially between the executive and legislative. The president, as the commander in
chief and head of the executive branch, has unique powers to shape the military’s structure and
operation, but the legislative branch can influence nuclear policy through its power of the purse, as
well as its responsibility for ratifying treaties.
Presidential and congressional electoral cycles bring periodic shifts in leadership that, while
critical to democracy, may frustrate foreign governments with which the United States deals. At
a minimum, electoral cycles may allow inertia to operate during transitions and inject delays
into arms control talks as new officials are appointed and develop policy positions.
Congress has periodically exerted its budgetary prerogative in adjusting funding for parti-
cular strategic systems relative to the president’s annual budget proposal. The ‘MX’ missile
(LGM-118A Peacekeeper) was controversial throughout its history, and Congress rejected fund-
ing for deployment in 1976 and 1982 over concerns about the vulnerability of basing.14 Under
the George W. Bush administration, Congress denied funding for a Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW), designed to replace the W76 warhead on the D-5 submarine-launched ballistic
13Robert Soofer, ‘The politics of nuclear weapons policy’, Comparative Strategy 35(2), (2016), pp. 169–170.
14The system was finally funded and deployed in 1986. ‘House, 245–176, Votes Down $988 Million for MX Missile: Setback for
Reagan Policy’, New York Times, 8 December 1982, https://www.nytimes.com/1982/12/08/us/house-245-176-votes-down-988-
million-for-mx-missile-setback-for-reagan-policy.html (accessed 29 November 2018).
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missile, despite the looming mass obsolescence of the W76.15 Missile defense, a significant
issue in Sino–US strategic relations, has also been subject to particular congressional scrutiny
since the Strategic Defense Initiative was launched during the 1980s.16
Finally, both bureaucratic actors and Congress have an important say in potential arms control
agreements, the former with input during the policy formulation phase and the latter with its
power to ratify or reject treaties.17 President Jimmy Carter wrote that during the preparation of the
SALT II Treaty, it ‘required at least as much time negotiating within our country as with the
Soviets.’18 During the ratification process, Senator Henry Jackson, a Democratic Senator, demanded
that the president renegotiate the treaty to require symmetrical cuts to the Soviet arsenal.19
Similarly, President Barack Obama’s desire to push towards ‘global zero’ quickly ran into counter-
vailing pressure from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Republican Congressmen. To gain
approval for the New START treaty, Obama was forced to pledge extensive modernization of
nuclear forces and infrastructure.20
There are functional differences in the roles that these actors play, and one could argue that the
policy system effectively synthesizes important inputs. Congressmen may view themselves as
responsible for the nation’s fiscal health, while the military sees its voice as critical to avoiding
strategic mistakes. However, as many have observed, bureaucratic actors also have narrow orga-
nizational interests, and bargaining does not always produce rational outcomes.21 Two-level games
—in which actors simultaneously pursue domestic and international policy ‘games’—affect out-
comes in the executive-congressional dynamic.22 In the SALT II example, one might ask the extent
to which Senator Jackson was concerned about symmetry in arms control or was, rather, continu-
ing a political battle with Carter, his opponent in the 1976 presidential primary. As Soofer writes,
‘foreign and national security policy is a continuation of domestic policy and politics by other
means.’23
Partisan politics
The most important sources of domestic complications stem from domestic political (or
‘second image’) factors—and these have grown more significant over time.24 A wide range
of research demonstrates that politics have become increasingly polarized, with the gap
between the positions of two primary political parties growing at both the popular level
and within Congress.25 Prior to the mid-1960s, Democrats supported higher levels of military
spending, collective security, and international institutions like the United Nations, while the
Republicans were generally in opposition to each of those. Since the 1960s, Democrats have
15Jeffrey Lewis, ‘After the reliable replacement warhead: What’s next for the U.S. nuclear arsenal’, Arms Control Today, 8
December 2008, https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2008_12/Lewis (accessed 29 November 2018).
16For the influence of politics on early decisions related to missile defense, see Morton H. Halperin, ‘The decision to deploy the
ABM: Bureaucratic and domestic politics in the Johnson administration’, World Politics 25(1), (1972), pp. 62–95.
17Steven E. Miller, ‘Politics over promise: Domestic impediments to arms control’, International Security 8(4), (1984), pp. 67–90.
18Jimmy Carter, Keeping Faith: Memoirs of a President (Fayetteville, NC: University of Arkansas Press, 1995).
19‘Jackson vows senate fight over SALT II’, Washington Post, 18 June 1979, https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/politics/
1979/06/18/jackson-vows-senate-fight-over-salt-ii/ (accessed 29 November 2018).
20Soofer, ‘The politics of nuclear weapons policy’, p. 173.
21Indeed, this is the core contention of the latter two models in Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision. For an application to
nuclear arms control, see Miller, ‘Politics Over Promise’, 1984; and Jeffrey W. Knopf, ‘Beyond two-level games: Domestic–
international interaction in the intermediate-range nuclear forces negotiations’, International Organization 47(4), (1993), pp.
599–628.
22Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and
Domestic Politics (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1993).
23Soofer, ‘The Politics of Nuclear Weapons Policy,’ pp. 169–170.
24Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979/2001).
25See, for example, Lilliana Mason, Uncivil Agreement: How Politics Became our Identity (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press,
2018); and Geoffrey C. Layman, Thomas M. Carsey, and Juliana Menasce Horowitz, ‘Party polarization in American politics:
Characteristics, causes, and consequences’, Annual Review of Political Science 9, (2006), pp. 83–110.
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come to be more skeptical of higher military spending and military intervention but have
retained their support for international institutions. Republicans, on the other hand, have
become even more wary of international institutions, while shifting to support higher levels
of defense spending.26 The gap on these issues has grown steadily. Public opinion surveys
demonstrate the persistence of a major gap between the parties.27 On nuclear issues,
significant differences between the parties exist in three specific areas: the emphasis on
nuclear weapons in security policy, support for nuclear arms control, and the role and
importance of national missile defense.
In the wake of the Cold War, a partisan debate over the role nuclear weapons should play in
broader US security strategy has emerged. The differing visions are evident in successive versions
of the NPR. In the 1994 NPR, the Clinton Administration argued ‘nuclear weapons are playing a
smaller role in US security than at any other time in the nuclear age.’28 In contrast, portions of the
Bush administrations NPR leaked in 2001 called for ‘adaptive planning’ to facilitate a more flexible
role for nuclear weapons in addressing a range of threats.29 The Obama administration’s 2010
review set out a major goal to ‘reduc[e] the role of US nuclear weapons.’30 It declared, ‘the United
States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are
party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligation.’ Finally, the
Trump administration’s NPR highlights a range of ‘extreme circumstances’ that might warrant
nuclear use. While there are elements of continuity across these four documents, there are also
consistent variations that track along party lines.
The parties also differ in their views of arms control. In recent years, the Democratic Party has
been more inclined to support arms control, while the Republican Party has supported greater
freedom of action to address security needs unilaterally. The refusal of Senate Republicans to
support ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty during the Clinton administration was an
early example, though all three subsequent administrations have abided by its provisions. More
important in terms of policy results was the George W. Bush administration’s unilateral withdrawal
from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, which enabled substantial deployments of actual
hardware. While an Al Gore administration might have moved in similar directions, it would not
have pursued the unilateral approach to ABM withdrawal.31 In October 2018, President Trump
announced that he was withdrawing from the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF)
although the facts on Russia’s violations have not changed since Obama was president.
The Bush administration’s Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which continued the
START process, reflected the administration’s limited interest in detailed arms control. As Steven
Pifer has observed, ‘While START I and New START each made a good-sized book, SORT barely filled
two pages.’32 Without updated definitions of critical terms or monitoring provisions, SORT failed to
keep up with changes in the technological environment. The Obama administration’s return to
26Gyung-Ho Jeong and Paul J. Quirk, ‘Division at the water’s edge: The polarization of foreign policy’, American Politics Research
1(30), (2017), p. 10.
27See party data in Gallup, ‘Americans not convinced U.S. Needs to spend more on defense’, Gallup, 21 February 2018, http://
news.gallup.com/poll/228137/americans-not-convinced-needs-spend-defense.aspx (accessed 29 November 2018); and
Gallup, ‘In U.S., 37% Say UN doing “Good Job” solving problems’, Gallup, 24 February 2017, http://news.gallup.com/poll/
204290/say-doing-good-job-solving-problems.aspx (accessed 29 November 2018).
28Quoted in Janne Nolan and Brian Radzinsky, ‘Continuity from ambiguity: The real role of nuclear posture reviews in U.S.
Nuclear strategy’, War on the Rocks Blog, 19 February 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/02/continuity-ambiguity-real-
role-nuclear-posture-reviews-u-s-nuclear-strategy/ (accessed 29 November 2018).
29Walter Pincus, ‘U.S. Nuclear arms stance modified by policy study’,Washington Post, 23 March 2002, https://www.washington
post.com/archive/politics/2002/03/23/us-nuclear-arms-stance-modified-by-policy-study/ (accessed 29 November 2018).
30U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review, Washington, DC, (2010), p. vvi. http://archive.defense.gov/npr/docs/
2010%20Nuclear%20Posture%20Review%20Report.pdf (accessed 3 December 2018).
31Stanley Hoffman, ‘The high and the mighty: Bush’s national security strategy and the new American hubris’, The American
Prospect 13(25), (2003), 28–31.
32Steven Pifer, ‘SORT vs. New START: Why the Administration is Leery of a Treaty’, Brookings Up Front, 15 March 2013, https://
www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2013/03/15/sort-vs-new-start-why-the-administration-is-leery-of-a-treaty/ (accessed 29
November 2018).
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detailed constraints under the New START treaty was opposed by Senate Republicans. Obama
secured the necessary two-thirds majority only by a ‘promise to modernize the American nuclear
weapons complex and the nuclear delivery systems.’33 Follow-on negotiations were precluded by
the deterioration in geostrategic relations precipitated by the Russian invasion of Crimea.
Republican skepticism of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, capped by Trump’s
withdrawal from it, provides still another example of the broader Republican attitude towards arms
control.34
Perhaps most prominently, party positions differ on missile defense, which have been regarded
much more favorably under Republican administrations than Democratic ones.35 The George W.
Bush administration aggressively pursued the ground-based missile defense architecture for home-
land defense, overriding traditional testing and procurement rules. While the Obama administra-
tion also increased deployed missile defense systems, it slowed the pace planned under the Bush
administration.36 Although the Missile Defense Review from the Trump Administration is not yet
available, it promises assertive advocacy for more research. Republicans in Congress want even
faster deployment and funded the Missile Defense Agency at over 30% more than the adminis-
tration requested in FY2018.37 Congress also requested testing of the SM-3 block IIA interceptor
against an ICBM-like target.38 This is directly salient to the US–China relationship. By pursuing
capability against ICBMs, the initiative contradicts bipartisan statements from administrations back
to the 1990s asserting a sharp distinction between national missile defense and theater missile
defense—in part to reassure Russia and China that their retaliatory capabilities would remain
unchallenged by such theater capabilities.
In all these cases, while strategic rationale certainly influences final outcomes, one could not
come to a complete understanding of the way policy was formed and indeed its final form without
recognizing the domestic political competition.
Bureaucratic politics and processes
Organizational politics can also have a profound impact on strategic nuclear policy. A number
of bureaucratic actors have important roles in preparing and vetting policy. Within the
Defense Department, each of the services, especially the Air Force and Navy, has a nuclear
constituency. Strategic Command is charged with overseeing strategic deterrence. The State
Department plays a major role in shaping arms control and alliance assurance policy.
These constituencies historically played a major role in shaping policy. In his work on the
‘origins of overkill’ during the 1950s and 1960s, David Rosenberg found that the Strategic Air
Command (SAC) dominated the process of selecting targets and establishing criteria on which
‘sufficiency’ against targets would be judged. In virtually every respect, its goals and criteria
exceeded those of nuclear actors from the other military services and civilian specialists.
33Walter Pincus, ‘How many nuclear options does a president need to deter or to attack’, Washington Post, April 2015, https://
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/how-many-ways-does-the-air-force-need-to-deliver-a-nuclear-weapon/
2015/04/20/c33eeb96-e5dc-11e4-81ea-0649268f729e_story.html (accessed 29 November 2018).
34In the midst of Obama administration’s negotiations, 47 Republican senators published an open letter to Iran warning them
that any agreement without legislative approval could be overturned by the next president ‘with the stroke of a pen’. ‘G.O.P.
Senators’ Letter to Iran About Nuclear Deal Angers White House’, New York Times, 9 March 2015, accessed 29 November
2018.
35Roger Handberg, ‘The symbolic politics of ballistic missile defense: Seeking the perfect defense in an imperfect world’,
Defense & Security Analysis 31(1), (2015), pp. 44–57.
36Peter Baker, ‘White house scraps Bush’s approach to missile shield,’ The New York Times, 17 September 2009, https://www.
nytimes.com/2009/09/18/world/europe/18shield.html (accessed 29 November 2018).
37Jen Judson, ‘Congress provides $3.3 billion boost for missile defense in FY18 spending bill’, Defense News, 21 March 2018,
https://www.defensenews.com/land/2018/03/22/congress-provides-33-billion-boost-for-missile-defense-in-fy18-spending-
bill/ (accessed 29 November 2018).
38Eric Gomez, ‘America is about to expand its missile defenses dramatically (But There is a Problem)’, National Interest, 28
November 2017, https://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-skeptics/america-about-expand-its-missile-defenses-dramatically-there-
23392 (accessed 29 November 2018).
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President Eisenhower decided for strategic reasons that ‘massive retaliation’ should serve as
the centerpiece of US military strategy, but he was horrified by SAC’s planned implementa-
tion of the strategy.39
Other examples abound.40 Lynn Eden has demonstrated that the models used in targeting
decision during the Cold War systematically underestimated the damage that would result.41 This
discrepancy, which could only be explained by organizational imperatives rather than technical
uncertainty, artificially inflated force structure requirements. Similarly, Eric Schlosser’s recent assess-
ment, Command and Control, looks at nuclear weapons safety, highlighting bureaucratic stove
piping, excessive classification, and competition between nuclear weapons laboratories in under-
mining nuclear weapons reliability and the security of the command and control systems.42
The role of organizational dynamics and bureaucratic politics continues to shape nuclear
policy today. Despite having vastly different needs than in peak periods of the nuclear weapons
production, the National Nuclear Security Administration retains the bulk of the laboratory
structure from that era. Certainly, the lab structure has evolved and valuable ‘big science’ is
conducted at the facilities. But the legacy of the Cold War has constrained change in the
structure of these organizations. While there is plausible strategic merit in maintaining a land-
based nuclear deterrent in ICBMs, such vulnerable and, when armed with MIRVs, acutely
destabilizing, given the ability of an adversary to destroy multiple warheads with a single
weapon.43 Similarly, strategic bombers, which are soft targets loaded with multiple warheads,
may be acutely destabilizing if not deployed and handled appropriately. A mix of Air Force
organizational interests and senators from states where such weapons are deployed have
worked against restructuring the US arsenal.
The continuing legacy of US domestic factors affects US–China relations
It is clear that domestic politics and bureaucratic interests and processes influence US strategic
policy. They will continue to do so for the foreseeable future. Missile defense systems will continue
to be prioritized despite their uneven test record and their impact on the strategic thinking of
others. Missile defense is a particularly salient issue for Chinese nuclear threat perceptions, and the
impact of domestic politics on this issue thus has a pronounced impact on the bilateral relation-
ship. Ebbs and flows in partisan politics will send conflicting messaging regarding the sizing and
role of US nuclear weapons in war plans interacting with and influencing Chinese views on the role
of nuclear weapons in its own security policy. Service (and indeed branch) rivalries will provide
pressure for a diverse set of capabilities—more diverse than strategic necessities warrant. In all
these areas, shifting US policy will send signals to China and others about the unreliability of US
declaratory policy and arms control commitments.
Domestic sources of Chinese nuclear policy
A full accounting of the domestic drivers in Chinese strategic nuclear policymaking must necessarily
await the opening of Chinese archives. In the meantime, however, a few broad generalizations may be
39David Alan Rosenberg, ‘The origins of overkill: Nuclear weapons and American strategy, 1945–1960’, International Security 7
(4), (1983), pp. 3–71.
40In addition to those discussed below, see Scott Sagan, The Limits of Safety: Organizations, Accidents, and Nuclear Weapons,
Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Fred Kaplan, The
Wizards of Armageddon (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1983).
41Lynn Eden, Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University
Press, 2006).
42Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident, and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin
Books, 2014).
43Jon Wolfsthal, ‘The political and military vulnerability of America’s land-based nuclear missiles’, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
73(3), (2017), pp. 150–53.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 547
made about trends in the Chinese decision-making system, about the relative size and bureaucratic
rank of nuclear constituencies, and about the impact of bureaucratic structures and processes.44 The
analysis below finds that long-term trends in China’s governing system open the door to relatively
greater influence by bureaucratic actors in nuclear decision-making than was the case under the first
two generations of Chinese leadership. Within the PLA, the primary element responsible for the nuclear
deterrentmission, the Rocket Force (previously called the Second Artillery Force), has steadily advanced
in stature, while the modernization and expansion of the PLA Navy’s SSBN force has effectively created
a new nuclear constituency. Finally, the growth of the Rocket Force’s conventional missile forces and
the lack of a bureaucratic firewall between the conventional and nuclear sides of this single service are
accelerating the development of capabilities relevant to nuclear warfighting—with potential implica-
tions for China’s future nuclear doctrine.
From rational actor model to the bureaucratization of policymaking?
Since 1949, China’s political leadership configuration has made policymaking there a good candidate for
the rational actor model, in which the state behaves as a logical, unitary actor in response to external
threats, pressures, and opportunities. China emerged from Japanese occupation and civil war with a
tightly fused political and military leadership. All senior statesmen had spent decades within both the
Communist Party political and military hierarchies. The military was tightly subordinated to political
authority through professions of loyalty, as well as by the PLA’s political commissar system. Themembers
of the Central Military Commission (CMC), a Party organ chaired by the Communist Party chairman,
directedmost important aspects of military policy. For the first several decades after 1949, there was little
inter-service competition within a military that was dominated by ground forces commanders. Perhaps
most important, Mao Zedong emerged from the civil war as the recognized father of the new state and
remained dominant in foreign and security policy until his death in 1976.
To be sure, some of the observations listed abovemay also challenge the rational actor interpretation.
Near total army dominance of themilitary systematically privileged continental thinking inmilitary policy.
The political leadership was endowed with military experience, but much of that experience was in
revolutionary and guerrilla war, leading to a dismissiveness of conventional and to some extent nuclear
capabilities.45 And despiteMao’s legendary stature, therewere periodic political struggles thatwere bitter
and often lethal to the losers. In those struggles, Mao was willing to subordinate military policy to
perceived domestic political requirements.
Nevertheless, Chinese political leaders had the confidence and means to direct military policy,
and Mao viewed political and military imperatives as unified in ways that would, in his own mind,
produce desired outcomes in both realms. A unitary actor model does not necessarily predict a
particular strategic ‘rationality,’ but simply that the state reacts as a unified, logical actor. Certainly,
the first generation of Chinese leaders after the PRC’s founding had clear views on why possessing
nuclear weapons was essential, as well as on the limitations of their utility beyond a certain small
number. These views were translated into policies that limited the scale of China’s nuclear force
building and continue to serve as a major constraint on any change.
Chinese political leaders kept very immediate control of nuclear policy through a National
Defense Industry Special Commission (国防工业专门委员会), often referred to as the Central
Special Commission (中央专门委员会).46 The Central Special Commission, created in 1962 and
44This section of this article builds upon and expands on earlier work by the authors. See Eric Heginbotham, Michael Chase,
Jacob L. Heim, Bonny Lin, Mark Cozad, Lyle Morris, Christopher P. Twomey, Forrest Morgan, Michael Nixon, Cristina Garafola,
and Samuel Berkowitz, China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, RR-1628-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2017).
45See Prashant Kumar Singh, ‘Rereading Mao’s military thought’, Strategic Analysis 37(5), (2013), pp. 558–580; and Christopher
P. Twomey, The Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Ithaca, New York: Cornell
University Press, 2010).
46The Central Special Commission moniker was short for still another unofficial name for the group, the Chinese Communist
Party Central Specialist Commission of Fifteen (中共中央15人专门委员会).
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comprised of 15 members from the political, military, and scientific communities, was tasked with
coordinating nuclear weapons development.47 Evidence that Chinese political leaders have histori-
cally maintained a hands-on approach to managing nuclear development can be found in specific
decisions. Senior leaders have, for example, vetoed the deployment of capabilities that were within
China’s technological means. Despite having successfully tested an enhanced radiation warhead in
1988, China never deployed the system, which was deemed to be of limited strategic utility and
inconsistent with declaratory policy.48 Similarly, although China was technologically capable of
deploying multiple reentry vehicles as early as the late 1970s, it did not do so until the 2010s—a
delay of decades.49 In both cases, scientific and military impetus accounted for some aspects of
nuclear policy (especially during development) but could not drive deployment and acquisition of
systems in the absence of political support.
While elements of continuity in Chinese security policymaking persist, conditions and institutions
have changed in significant ways. Since Jiang Zemin took power in 1989, civilian leaders have come to
office with far less military experience and knowledge than their predecessors and have, therefore,
been more dependent on advisors and the military itself for information and expertise. Following his
accession to power in 1978, Deng Xiaoping established rules and procedures that would limit one-man
rule and encourage adherence to collective leadership. Strict retirement ages for Party, military, and
civilian leadership positions were introduced, limiting the general secretary’s ability to place allies in key
positions. The composition, roles, and functions of different actors have been better defined and, to an
extent, respected, introducing a trend towards the ‘regularization,’ or bureaucratization, of govern-
ment. This phenomenon extends into the military realm. Retirement ages are enforced and the
structure of different offices within the PLA has been made more clearly defined. While the ground
forces are still predominant, the other services (the Navy, Air Force, and Rocket Force) have gained in
rank and standing, a situation that appears to have accelerated in the 19th Party Congress.50
All of this might suggest a system in which more scope exists for bureaucracies to
influence policy. To be sure, critical elements of political control remain in place, and the
state may still behave much as the rational actor model might predict. The CMC, headed by
the Party general secretary, still dominates military policy, providing a potentially strong
mechanism for top-down control, as well as the integration of service priorities. Xi Jinping
has centralized power to an extent not seen since Deng Xiaoping in the 1980s.51 His antic-
orruption campaign, while serving its stated goal to reduce the role of graft, also gives him a
powerful tool to use selectively against political opponents.52 That said, the tool serves
political goals, rather than geostrategic rationality. The maneuvers at the 19th Party
Congress paved the way for Xi to abolish constitutional limits and will allow him to remain
in a position of preeminent power after his previous term limits of two 5-year terms for the
General Secretary and President have ended.53 The Party under Xi Jinping has, meanwhile,
clawed back some functions that had migrated to state bureaucracies.54
47John Lewis and Xue Litai, China Builds the Bomb (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1988); and孙向丽 [Sun
Xiangli], 核时代的战略选择 [Strategic Choice in the Nuclear Age] (Beijing: China Academy of Engineering Physics Research
Center, 2013), p. 12.
48Jonathan Ray, Red China’s ‘Capitalist Bomb’: Inside the Chinese Neutron Bomb Program (Washington DC: Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January 2015).
49National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States through 2015
(Washington, DC: Federation of American Scientists, 1999).
50Derek Grossman and Michael S. Chase, ‘Xi’s consolidation of power at the 19th party congress: Implications for PLA aerospace
forces’, China Brief 17(16), (2017), pp. 7–10.
51Elizabeth Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
52Andrew Wedeman, Baogang Guo, and Eric Saikawa, ‘Xi Jinping’s tiger hunt and the politics of corruption’, China Currents 13
(2), (2014), pp. 1–7.
53Javier C. Hernández, ‘China’s “Chairman of Everything”: Behind Xi Jinping’s many titles’, The New York Times, 25 October 2017,
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/25/world/asia/china-xi-jinping-titles-chairman.html (accessed 29 November 2018); and
Willy Lam, ‘Xi Jinping forever,’ Foreign Policy, 1 April 2015, https://foreignpolicy.com/2015/04/01/xi-jinping-forever-china-
president-term-limits/ (accessed 29 November 2018).
54Carl Minzner, End of an Era: How China’s Authoritarian Revival is Undermining its Rise (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
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Nevertheless, Xi operates in a system that is far different from the one Mao dominated. He
remains constrained by stronger state and Party institutions. The military pays homage to the Party
but is far more focused on professional matters and warfighting than it was during the Maoist era.55
Additionally, retirement ages continued to exert controlling influence in the 19th Party Congress in
terms of central committee military officers and CMC members.56 And despite changes to the
composition of the CMC, Xi has not been able to ‘stack’ the CMC. In the nuclear realm, the Central
Special Commission still exists, but according to Chinese civilian experts, its functions are more
circumscribed; the day-to-day supervision of top leaders within it has declined since the 1970s, and
the role of the military in nuclear policymaking has grown.57 Senior PLA officers describe intense
inter-service competitions, with actors seeking Xin Jinping’s ear on a wide variety of issues, including
nuclear roles.58 Given the existing political and administrative landscape in China, it is likely bureau-
cratic factors will exert significant influence over nuclear outcomes in the years to come.59
Bureaucratic politics: rank and status of nuclear constituencies
Most organizational theorists identify parochial interests, including manpower, budgets, indepen-
dence, and prestige, as important drivers of policymaking.60 This section considers the rank and
standing of nuclear constituencies within the PLA and their potential role in nuclear weapons
advocacy. In this area, the evidence is clear: nuclear constituencies have gained ground, becoming
more capable advocates for nuclear force structure.
On 31 December 2015, the Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) was renamed as the Rocket Force
and elevated from a military branch [兵种] to a military service [军种]. (In this text, the term Second
Artillery is employed when discussing missile force developments prior to 2016 and the term
Rocket Force is used when discussing events since then.) Even prior to its elevation, the Second
Artillery had already made striking gains. Although officially a branch of the PLA and therefore
‘one-half notch lower in bureaucratic rank’ than a service, it had already gained many attributes of
a service.61 In official discussion of PLA elements, it was listed together with the services, last in the
sequence behind the PLA Army (PLAA), Navy (PLAN), and Air Force (PLAAF). After 2004, the PLASAF
commander, like the service commanders, gained an institutionalized seat on the CMC.62 During
the 19th Party Congress, the CMC was streamlined, but all three of the technical services maintain
some representation on it.
China’s 2004 Defense White Paper noted that ‘[T]he PLA gives priority to the building of the Navy,
Air Force and Second Artillery Force to seek balanced development of the combat force structure, in
order to strengthen the capabilities for winning both command of the sea and command of the air,
55Andrew Scobell, ‘China’s evolving civil-military relations: Creeping Guojiahua’, Armed Forces and Society 31(2), (2005), pp.
227–244.
56James Mulvenon, ‘Oh Fang, Where Art Thou? Xi Jinping and the PLA’s 90th anniversary’, China Leadership Monitor 54, (2016),
pp. 1–4.
57Interviews, Beijing, May 16–17, 2014.
58Interviews, April 2018.
59Lampton highlights the challenges of civilian control as it pertains to the Chinese system. David M. Lampton, Following the
Leader: Ruling China, from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2014), ch. 6.
60On the impact of bureaucratic politics, see Allison and Zelikow, Essence of Decision; Jerel A. Rosati, ‘Developing a systematic
decision-making framework: Bureaucratic politics in perspective’, World Politics 33(2), (1981), pp. 234–252; and Jack Snyder,
The Ideology of the Offensive: Military Decision Making and the Disasters of 1914 (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1984).
61Bates Gill, James C. Mulvenon, and Mark Stokes, ‘The Chinese second artillery corps: Transition to credible deterrence’, in
Mulvenon and Andrew N.D. Yang, eds., The People’s Liberation Army as Organization (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation,
2002), p. 520. See also Kenneth Allen and Maryanne Kivelhan-Wise, ‘Implementing PLA second artillery doctrinal reforms:
Emerging trends in the operational art of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army’, in James Mulvenon and David Finkelstein,
eds., China’s Revolution in Doctrinal Affairs (Alexandria, VA: The CNA Corporation, 2005), p. 167.
62James Mulvenon, ‘The King Is Dead! Long Live the King! The CMC leadership transition from Jiang to Hu,’ China Leadership
Monitor 13, (2005), p. 6. Mulvenon assesses these promotion pathways.
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and conducting strategic counter-strikes.’63 The 2006 white paper stated, ‘[t]hrough restructuring, the
proportion of the Navy, Air Force and Second Artillery Force [personnel] in the PLA has been raised
by 3.8 percent while that of the Army has been lowered by 1.5 percent.’64 Conversations with military
officers in 2018 emphasize the continued demobilization pressures on the Army, with added capacity
for the Navy and Rocket Forces.65 Recent white papers have emphasized the success of the PLASAF’s
modernization programs and that its ‘capabilities of strategic deterrence, nuclear counterattack and
conventional precision strike are being steadily elevated.’66
PLASAF commanders’ promotion timelines have advanced and normalized with those of the other
technical services.67 Li Xuge (1985–1992) was only a major general (shaojiang) when he became the
PLASAF commander, waited 3 years to be promoted to lieutenant general (zhongjiang), and was never
made a full general. Yang Guoliang (1992–2003), served as PLASAF commander for 8months before his
promotion to zhongjiang and then waited an additional five and a half years before becoming a full
general (shangjiang). In contrast, the PLAN and PLAAF commanders were promoted to full general
during or shortly after gaining command. From 1985 to 2018, all PLAAF commanders held the rank of
lieutenant general (zhongjiang) or higher before assuming their positions. Recent PLASAF commanders
have reached the rank of full general sooner and in line with their PLAN and PLAAF counterparts. Wei
Fenghe, commander of the Rocket Force from October 2012 until September 2017, was promoted to
full general less than a month after assuming command. These promotion trends both reflect and
contribute to the growing bureaucratic weight of the Rocket Force.
Analysis of the promotion trends within the Rocket Force also suggest important substantive
conclusions deriving from the bureaucratic personnel system.68 Most importantly, ‘Members of the
senior leadership are more likely to have served at Base 52, the Rocket Force’s preeminent
conventional base, than any other missile base.’69 Given that this base is the Rocket Forces’
‘dominant conventional base,’ it is likely that the senior leadership is increasing imbued with an
understanding of strategy that comes from the conventional side of the force. Because the
conventional forces emphasize warfighting, and the early use of their missiles to provide decisive
advantage, this influence could have dramatic implications for future nuclear strategy.
In announcing the creation of the PLA Rocket Force, Xi Jinping said, ‘The Rocket Force is our
country’s core strategic deterrent force; it is the strategic support for our country’s major power
status; and it is an important foundation for safeguarding our nation’s security.’70 Other Chinese
observers note that the elevation of the Rocket Force brings the organization’s status in line with
its current material development, which has produced a large force with capabilities critical to the
PLA’s overall function.71 The change in formal status, and the accompanying political endorsement
of the missile forces, will presumably make the Rocket Force a more capable advocate for nuclear
63China State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2004, ‘Ch. III. Revolution in military affairs with Chinese
characteristics’, December 2004, http://en.people.cn/whitepaper/defense2004/defense2004.html (accessed 3 December
2018).
64State Council Information Office, China’s National Defense in 2006, December 2006, http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/
book/194482.htm (accessed 14 October 2018).
65See also, ‘Reform to downsize PLA army, boost navy numbers,’ Global Times, 11 July 2017, http://www.globaltimes.cn/
content/1055927.shtml (accessed 3 December 2018).
66State Council Information Office, ‘Modernization of the People’s Liberation Army’, China’s National Defense in 31 March 2010,
2011; State Council Information Office, The Diversified Employment of China’s Armed Forces, 2013, http://en.people.cn/90786/
8209362.html (accessed 3 December 2018).
67Sources for this analysis include中国战略导弹部队百科全书 [China Strategic Missile Force Encyclopedia] (Beijing: China
Encyclopedia Publishing House, 2012), pp. 878–880.
68David C. Logan, ‘Career paths in the PLA rocket force: What they tell US’, Asian Security 14(1), (2018), pp. 1–19.
69Ibid., p. 7.
70陆军领导机构火箭军战略支援部队成立大会在京举行: 习近平向中国人民解放军陆军火箭军战略支援部队授予军
旗并致训词 [‘Meeting to Establish the PLA Army General Command, Rocket Force, and Strategic Support Group held in
Beijing: Xi Jinping Confers Flag and Makes Address’], 人民日报 [People’s Daily], 2 January 2016, http://politics.people.com.cn/
n1/2016/0102/c1024-28003584.html (accessed 29 November 2018).
71专家: 二炮为何升格为第四大军种火箭军? [‘Specialist: Why was the Second Artillery Elevated as the Fourth Major Military
Service to the Rocket Force?’], 环球网 [GlobalNet], 9 January 2016, http://mil.huanqiu.com/observation/2016-01/8346721.
html (accessed on 29 November 2018).
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weapons and delivery systems, for support systems that may still be lacking (such as space-based
early warning systems), and for more flexible interpretation of policy and doctrine.
In addition to steady gains by the Second Artillery (now Rocket Force), the nuclear constituency
has also gained within other services. Although the PLA Navy plays a secondary role to the Rocket
Force in nuclear affairs, it has possessed strategic capabilities for 40 years.72 For most of this period,
the Navy operated only the Xia-class (Type 092) SSBM submarine which was neither reliable nor
safe, and most observers assess that the first-generation Xia-class SSBN never conducted a
deterrent patrol. However, China’s submarine-based nuclear deterrent has gained credibility with
the deployment of four Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs, each armed with a dozen JL-2 SLBMs.73 US
officials reportedly confirmed in December 2015 that a Jin-class SSBN had undertaken China’s first-
ever deterrence patrol, and, as of December 2018, it appears that China has launched at least one
and possibly two additional Jin-class submarines.74 China’s 2010 defense white paper notes that
the PLAN has enhanced its ‘strategic deterrence and counterattack’ capabilities.75
Officers with nuclear weapons expertise have thus far not figured heavily in Navy’s leadership.76
This is not surprising, given that there were only one to two boats of the Xia class for most of the
Navy’s nuclear history and that those boats rarely put to sea. The paucity of Navy leaders with
significant experience in the strategic force may have retarded strategic thought and development
within the Navy, but as operational commanders gain experience in the Jin-class and get pro-
moted, a more vigorous discussion of strategic issues is likely to emerge. More broadly, trends in
the PLA Navy will foster a leadership more comfortable with blue water operations that will be
more comfortable with strategic naval capabilities and strategies.77 Indeed, advocacy of a larger
nuclear role is already evident, with one officer commenting at a symposium on right-sizing China’s
nuclear forces that, ‘it would be a strategic mistake not to fully develop undersea nuclear forces.’78
In a major shift, the United States now assesses that the ‘PLAAF has been re-assigned a nuclear
mission.’79 It seems likely this has occurred, in part, to keep up with the Navy’s burgeoning nuclear
role. The PLA Air Force is currently seeking to recast itself as a ‘strategic air force’ more broadly, and
nuclear armaments may be part of that. Interviews with senior military officers from the PLA in
2018 made clear that the PLAAF as a service desires to play such a strategic nuclear role for
bureaucratic reasons. The PLAAF is developing a new, stealthy long-range bomber, which could
potentially serve as a strategic nuclear delivery platform.80 However, equipping this or the older H-
6 bombers with nuclear weapons would create tensions with several elements of China’s nuclear
72徐双喜 , 钱晓虎 [Xu Shuangxi, and Qian Xiaohu], ‘铸就共和国水下核盾:海军某潜艇基地官兵驾’蓝鲸’40余年从横大洋
创造数十项纪录’ [‘Forging the Underwater Shield of the Republic—Officers and Troops of a Certain Navy Submarine Base
Set Tens of Records During More Than 40 Years of Piloting “Blue Whales” Across the Length and Breadth of the Vast Ocean’],
解放军报 [PLA Daily], 28 October 2013, http://www.bjqx.org.cn/qxweb/n84557c711.aspx (accessed 29 November 2018).
73See Zhou Wa, ‘China seeks to calm US fears over missile’, China Daily, 16 January 2014; and Keck, ‘China Confirms’, 2014,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2014-01/16/content_17238362.htm (accessed 29 November 2018).
74Richard D. Fisher, ‘China advances sea- and land-based nuclear deterrent capabilities’, IHS Jane’s 360, 15 December 2015.
75Information Office of the State Council, China’s National Defense in 2010 (Beijing, 2011), http://en.people.cn/90001/90776/
90785/7336375 (accessed 3 December 2018). That language is repeated in the 2015 White Paper as well.
76Jeffrey Becker, David Liebenberg, and Peter Mackenzie, Behind the Periscope: Leadership in China’s Navy (Alexandria, VA:
Center for Naval Analysis, 2013), p. 123; Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy: New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st
Century (Suitland, Maryland: 2015), p. 173.
77David Liebenberg and Jeffrey Becker, ‘Recent personnel shifts hint at major changes on the horizon for PLA navy leadership’,
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pla-navy-leadership/ (accessed 3 December 2018).
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报 [Global Times], 18 December 2014, http://opinion.huanqiu.com/dialogue/2014-12/5255309.html (accessed 29 November
2018).
79Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and security developments involving the People’s Republic of China: Annual report to
congress (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), p. 77.
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defensenews.com/air/2018/10/11/in-first-china-confirms-new-long-range-strategic-bomber-designation/ (accessed 29
November 2018); See also Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, p. 112.
552 E. HEGINBOTHAM ET AL.
policy, and how it pursues air-launched nuclear weapons may pose a test of strategic vs. bureau-
cratic imperatives.
Nuclear bombers would likely be highly vulnerable, especially in light of China’s ‘no-first use’
doctrine, which precludes preemptive use, and its traditionally low nuclear alert levels. Employing
bombers in a nuclear role will almost certainly require changes to Chinese thinking on readiness
and might put additional pressure on its ‘no-first use’ policy. In terms of the actual weapon, China
might deploy either gravity bombs or miniaturized warheads for long-range air launched cruise
missiles. The latter option would give Chinese air-delivered nuclear weapons greater range but
would require other adjustments to policy; China has never deployed tactical nuclear weapons and
has rejected nuclear warfighting doctrines.81
Advocacy for a robust nuclear posture is likely to grow stronger in the years ahead. Most
obviously, the Rocket Force will be a more influential actor. With the deployment of a substantial
fleet of Jin-class submarines, the Navy’s interests in China’s nuclear deterrent have also increased.
The PLA Air Force will acquire a new fleet of long-range bombers that will provide the capability to
deliver nuclear weapons.82 This bureaucratic landscape, combined with an international nuclear
environment that Chinese strategists characterize as increasingly complex and challenging, is fertile
ground for the further growth of Chinese nuclear capabilities. What kinds of capabilities are
developed may be largely determined by organizational processes.
Organizational processes: shaping policy, posture, and strategy
While Chinese political leaders determine overall military trajectory, detailed force structure often
emerges from the routine functioning of the Chinese bureaucracy’s organizational units. Examining
the role that the functioning of these organizational units can have on force structure and posture
highlights an alternative driver: organizational process.83 As noted earlier, Chinese leaders can and
do sometimes intervene in force structure decisions. However, when Chinese leaders do not
intervene, then organizational processes can play a decisive role. Organizations tend to behave
according to SOPs, which means that organizational processes tend to produce a limited menu of
options. In the case of force structure, this often manifests itself in preferences for continued
incremental improvement to the services’ primary weapons system.
This section assesses the SOPs, perceptions, and priorities of the PLA Rocket Force, the PLA
Navy, and the PLA Air Force and assesses how organizational processes could affect three key
aspects of China’s minimum deterrent policy: inventory, quality, and posture.84 China has histori-
cally fielded a small inventory of nuclear systems. In terms of quality, Chinese systems were
characterized by poor accuracies and long launch times. In the case of posture, China’s nuclear
forces have been kept on low alert, with a priority on tight control over nuclear warheads at the
expense of survivability.85 These historical characteristics are consistent with China’s minimum
deterrent doctrine and its no first use policy. China’s minimum deterrent requires that only a small
number of missiles survive a first strike and retaliate. Striking these targets, which might consist of
cities and industrial centers, does not require a high degree of precision. And China’s no first policy
obviates the need to strike quickly.
81The U.S. Intelligence Committee has had a changing view of the DH-10. Hans M. Kristensen, ‘Review of NASIC report 2017:
Nuclear force developments’, Federation of American Scientists, 30 June 2017, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2017/06/nasic-
2017/ (accessed 3 December 2018).
82Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, p. 112.
83This is inspired by Model II in Graham Allison’s classic work (Essence of Decision).
84For more on this topic, see Jeffrey Lewis, The Minimum Means of Reprisal: China’s Search for Security in the Nuclear Age
(Cambridge, MA: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 2007), p. 142.
85Warheads are centrally held at a storage facility in Taibai. A small number of warheads are routinely moved between central
storage and smaller warhead storage facilities associated with each of the six Rocket Force bases. See Mark Stokes, China’s
Nuclear Warhead Storage and Handling System (Arlington, VA: Project 2049 Institute, 2010).
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Evolving practice could alter this equation. The Second Artillery Corps began as an organization
exclusively concerned with operating nuclear-armed missiles, but it assumed a conventional missile
strike mission in the early 1990s. Since then, it has fielded a growing number of brigades armed
with conventional missiles. Today, more than half of the Rocket Force’s brigades are armed with
conventional missiles and roughly 70% of its launchers are allocated to conventional missile
systems.86 The operating procedures developed for these conventional missiles have given the
Second Artillery experience dispersing ballistic missiles for survivability, maintaining communica-
tions and sustainment with the dispersed forces, and remaining prepared to launch an attack in the
face of adversary countermeasures.
There are effectively no organizational firewalls between the conventional and nuclear elements
of the force. Uniformed personnel move back and forth between the two, and the force shares
common research and development facilities and production lines. Consequently, in the absence of
a strong political directive opposing such a move, advances in conventional capability are likely to
be applied to the nuclear forces. Capabilities might include greater missile accuracy; dynamic
retargeting; the ability to coordinate and launch large salvos; and the exercise of launchers under
battlefield conditions.
● Accuracy: Conventional missiles designed for battlefield use require far higher levels of
accuracy than nuclear missiles designed for countervalue (city-busting) use. Having devel-
oped technologies for the former (INS, SATNAV, post-boost maneuvers), those technologies
may be applied to new nuclear designs, since they are ‘on the shelf.’ The next generation of
nuclear ballistic missiles could, thus, be far more accurate than China’s legacy ICBMs. The DF-
26, unveiled in 2015, is the first missile developed from the outset to serve both nuclear and
conventional roles. As the 2016 DoD report on Chinese military power notes, if the nuclear
version of the DF-26 ‘shares the same guidance capabilities’ as the conventional version, it
‘would give China its first nuclear precision strike capability against theater targets.’87
● Dynamic retargeting: The Second Artillery has been building its C4ISR capabilities in order to
strike moving or time-sensitive targets such as aircraft carriers with the DF-21D and the ASBM
variant of the DF-26.88 The experience, training, and technology developed for this conven-
tional mission could be applied to more portions of the conventional force (starting perhaps
with systems like the DF-21C that might target dynamic land targets), and ultimately to the
nuclear force.
● Salvo size and battlefield operation: While China’s nuclear doctrine does call for the launch of
counterattacks in waves, salvo capability is more frequently exercised in the conventional
missile forces.89 The latter also include smaller and, on the whole, more modern systems and
may be exercised under simulated battlefield conditions. With personnel moving back and
forth between the conventional and nuclear forces, commanders in the latter will have more
experience operating under battlefield conditions and will be more inclined to consider
modes and strategies of nuclear warfighting doctrines.90
Individually, these capabilities will enhance China’s nuclear retaliatory capability. Existing
Chinese doctrinal writings already call for the ability to survive on a nuclear battlefield and to
deliver ‘waves’ of counterstrikes, even if China has never had the capability to execute such
86Institute of International Security Studies (IISS), Military Balance, 2018 (London: IISS, 2018).
87Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China (Washington, DC:
Department of Defense, 2016), p. 25.
88Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, p. 116.
89See, for example, reports on a 2017 exercise broadcast on one of China’s Central Television Stations. ‘中国十枚东风21齐亮
相: 可12分钟内摧毁美军亚太基地’ [‘Simultaneous launch of 10 DF-21 missiles: Could destroy U.S. Asian bases in 12 min’],
Sina, 13 June 2017.
90Heginbotham et al., China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent, pp. 115–116.
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doctrine. When combined, however, these improved capabilities could also provide Chinese
policymakers with a wider range of strategy options. These could include a limited warfighting
option—such as the ability to respond flexibly for the purposes of escalation control or, potentially,
to launch damage-limiting strikes against a second-tier nuclear competitor. New capabilities could
prompt Chinese nuclear commanders to advocate for a de facto adjustment of nuclear operating
concepts, even if the capabilities themselves were not developed specifically for such purposes.
According to a rational actor interpretation, an evolution towards a more capable nuclear force
would be a clear indication that China’s leaders intend to move beyond a strict minimum
deterrence strategy. But such changes could simply be the result of organizational proclivities for
continued incremental modernization. The two possibilities are not mutually exclusive; more
important, the implications would be the same. Even if senior civilian leaders remained committed
to the historically limited view of nuclear requirements—itself an open question—today’s leaders
appear less involved in detailed oversight than their predecessors, opening the door to heavier
influence from scientific and bureaucratic actors.
The acquisition of a larger and more credible nuclear force within the PLA Navy raises other
questions about Chinese nuclear force posture. The PLA Navy will likely face pressure to change its
SOP for handling nuclear weapons—at least in the case of SSBNs and possibly more widely.
Currently, China maintains at least most of its nuclear forces in a low state of readiness, with
warheads not mated to missiles. If, however, China intends to have its SSBNs conduct deterrence
patrols, then it will have to enable the mating of nuclear warheads with ballistic missiles more
routinely during peacetime.91 Indeed, there are signs of possible warhead storage facilities being
created by the Navy near the main SSBN port on Hainan island.92 And if the PLAN indeed maintains
permanent warhead storage and routinely mates warheads to missiles, then the Rocket Force
might see this as a challenge to its status as the nation’s leading nuclear force and may argue that
it should conduct its own ‘deterrence patrols,’ mating nuclear warheads to its road-mobile ICBMs
and dispersing them from bases on a more regular basis.
Routine SSBN patrols will likely require China to improve the technical controls on its warheads.
As of the late 1990s, China was not believed to have ‘permissive action links’ on its warheads.
Jeffrey Lewis cites this as evidence that China does not plan on frequently deploying warheads
mated to delivery systems, and instead relies on physical separation between the launcher and
warhead to avoid accidental and unauthorized launches.93 Adding sophisticated technical use
controls to facilitate SSBN patrols could open the door for similar changes and more regular
Second Artillery deployments with mated warheads.
Conclusion
Both Chinese and US nuclear forces will continue to be shaped by international and domestic
factors. Political and bureaucratic organizations and imperatives in Washington and Omaha (the
home of STRATCOM) will likely continue to exert significant effects on US strategic posture. Missile
defense systems will, for example, continue to be prioritized despite their uneven track record in
testing. Ebbs and flows in partisan politics will send conflicting messages regarding the size and
role of US nuclear weapons in war plans. Service (and indeed branch) rivalries will provide pressure
for a more diverse set of strategic capabilities than necessities warrant. Even if international
conditions become more promising, arms control will be constrained by partisan politics. And
91There are, of course, alternatives. The PLAN might, for example, get its own warhead storage facilities near the SSBNs but not
mate the warheads except during a crisis. The PLAN might also choose to have its SSBNs patrol without nuclear warheads
while still creating doubt in the mind of potential adversaries about whether or not there are any warheads on the
submarines.
92Hans Kristensen, Federation of American Scientists, forthcoming paper, 2019.
93Lewis, Minimum Means of Reprisal, p. 38.
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the apparent willingness of US leaders unilaterally to terminate agreements will, in any case, make
the United States a less appealing partner in such activities.
As the PLA’s technical services behave less like appendages to a revolutionary army and more
like modern bureaucracies competing for defense resources, bureaucratic factors are also likely to
become more important in the Chinese case. The creation of the PLA Rocket Force has created a
more powerful advocate for nuclear forces and missions. The construction of a viable SSBN fleet
had also created a stronger nuclear constituency within the PLA Navy and, as importantly,
motivated the PLA Air Force to complete the nuclear triad by acquiring a nuclear mission of its
own. More broadly, the PLA Navy and Air Force have made incremental gains in status over the
years, giving them greater ability to push for their positions. External events in China’s nuclear
environment, including the growth of Indian, Pakistani, and North Korean nuclear capabilities as
well as new weapons and thinking in the United States, are likely to work together with bureau-
cratic drivers in ways that are mutually reinforcing if not always strategically optimal.
Technological advances in conventional missile and naval forces will pose new questions for
Beijing about policy and doctrine. Applying technologies developed for the Rocket Force’s con-
ventionally armed ballistic missile to nuclear systems would provide China with limited counter-
force or nuclear warfighting options. Although the PLA may not adopt doctrines consistent with
those capabilities, its nuclear forces would no longer be solely suitable for a second strike,
minimum deterrence doctrine. Historically, the leadership has faced important decisions about
whether to develop new nuclear-related capabilities. Today, if it wishes to maintain a force
structure strictly consistent with a highly believable no-first use policy, it faces questions about
whether it should not introduce particular capabilities.
Unless the Chinese leadership exercises great self-discipline, the PLA is likely to develop a range
of strategic capabilities associated with disarming first strikes, a damage-limitation launch-on-
warning posture, or a second-strike approach that embraces extended nuclear warfighting or
counterforce targeting. Even if China acquires such capabilities, it will not necessarily abandon
no first use policy, but even without formal changes to policy or doctrine, force structure changes
could exacerbate security dilemmas with neighbors, who are likely to pay more attention to
Chinese capabilities than rhetoric.
The increasing salience of bureaucratic identities and politics in Chinese military decision-
making provides more scope for strategic entrepreneurship. A number of PLA officers and defense
researchers have advocated discarding China’s minimum deterrence strategy in favor of more
robust approaches. While a strict reading of China’s no first use pledge concludes that the sole
purpose of China’s nuclear forces is to deter a nuclear attack on China, there are a variety of views
among Chinese strategists about how useful nuclear weapons can be in deterring conventional
attacks. Some have suggested the PLA should develop limited nuclear warfighting capabilities, but
the majority couch their recommendations for modernizing the PLA’s nuclear force structure in
terms of improving its survivability in order to ensure the credibility of China’s deterrent.
The various changes to China’s decision-making may also interact with one another to accel-
erate change. The addition of capabilities relevant to warfighting could strengthen the proponents
of explicit change to policy. New capabilities would make their arguments more persuasive and
less expensive to realize. Maintaining a minimal deterrent would require greater effort by strong
central leaders to lean against the momentum for precision, responsiveness, mobility, and war-
fighting generated by conventional force modernization.
Finally, the domestic influences on US and Chinese nuclear policymaking are likely to be
mutually reinforcing. Both sides will assume that steps they see as inflammatory are taken with
strategic intent even when the actual drivers may be more mixed. China, for example, will likely
view missile defenses as aimed at negating its retaliatory capabilities, especially if defenses are
combined with new offensive capabilities. The United States, for its part, is likely to view more
flexible Chinese capabilities as part of strategy to limit US escalatory options in a significant conflict,
bringing about the stability–instability paradox and permitting China to take action at lower levels
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of conflict. While there may be elements of truth in such assessments, the logic and evidence
above suggests that domestic drivers may also play a critical role. And to the extent that domestic
factors are in fact responsible, the resulting spirals of suspicion and conflict will be inadvertent—
but may nevertheless take on a life of their own.
Acknowledgments
The authors are grateful for helpful comments by Bonnie Glaser, Jacques deLisle, and Mara Andersen on an earlier
version of this article. They also wish to recognize the contribution of Cristina Garafola, Lyle Morris, and Elbridge Colby
to their early thinking on these issues. The views presented in this article are those of the authors’ alone and do not
necessarily represent any official view of any institution with which they are affiliated.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributors
Eric Heginbotham is a principal research scientist at MIT’s Center for International Studies and a specialist in Asian
security issues. He co-edited China Steps Out: Beijing’s Major Power Engagement with the Developing World (Routledge,
2018) and was co-author of China’s Evolving Nuclear Deterrent (RAND, 2017), the U.S.-China Military Scorecard (2015),
and Chinese and Indian Strategic Behavior: Growing Power and Alarm (Cambridge University Press, 2012). He has
published in Foreign Affairs, International Security, The Washington Quarterly, Current History, and elsewhere. Before
joining MIT, he was a senior political scientist at the RAND Corporation.
Jacob L. Heim specializes in strategic assessment and defense analysis with a background in international relations
and mathematics. His research has focused on the military balance in the Western Pacific, wargaming, and the
evolution of military capabilities. He has served as a strategic analyst in the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for Strategy and Force Development and was a senior operations research analyst with the MITRE
Corporation. He is currently a defense policy researcher at the RAND Corporation and a term member at the
Council on Foreign Relations.
Christopher P. Twomey is an associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at the Naval
Postgraduate School, where he focuses on Chinese foreign policy and East Asian security issues. He authored The
Military Lens: Doctrinal Differences and Deterrence Failure in Sino-American Relations (Cornell University Press, 2010) and
articles in journals such as Security Studies, Journal of Contemporary China, The Washington Quarterly, and Asian Survey.
He has been the lead organizer of the US–China Strategic Dialogue, a track 1.5 diplomatic meeting on strategic
nuclear issues, since its inception in 2005. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
JOURNAL OF CONTEMPORARY CHINA 557
